



The past few years have seen an explosion of legislative activity around devel-
opments in genetics and assisted reproduction. In this chapter we examine
recently passed legislation in Australia and Canada in the area of genetic mod-
ification technologies and reproductive genetics. We demonstrate that legisla-
tive control in this area has a twofold purpose. Less controversially it is aimed
at providing limits to scientific innovation for the purpose of ensuring safe and
ethical research and experimentation. More controversially it is concerned with
what should be the proper "nature of reproduction," namely) how it happens
(sexually). between whom (a man and a woman. both human). in what kinds of
relationships (heterosexual). such that progeny. the product of reproduction.
inherit the blood/genes (bodily substances) of only two biological progenitors.
It IS to this latter purpose that we turn our attention in this chapter, analyzing
the role of law in limiting, determining, and constituting reproductive possibil-
ities in an age of genetic modification. Our focus is on new and potential tech-
nologies that enable inheritable genetic modification (IGM) of humans. but we
~ead these, and their legislative limits, in the context in which they appear med-
ically and legally. namely alongside other assisted reproductive technologies
(ARTs) such as reproductive cloning. We ask what is at stake in the new legisla-
tive limits. who benefits. who loses, and what kinds of humans are we left with?
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~eginning in t.he 1970s, it became routine to screen pregnant women in high-
risk groups usmg blood tests, sonograms, and other, more invasive techniques.
Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (eVS) are now used to detect
fetuses with anomalies, and therapeutic abortions are offered to women whose
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